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Abstract
Shared intentionality, or collaborative interactions in which individuals have a shared goal and must coordinate their
efforts, is a core component of human interaction. However, the biological bases of shared intentionality and, specifically,
the processes by which the brain adjusts to the sharing of common goals, remain largely unknown. Using functional near
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), coordination of cerebral hemodynamic activation was found in subject pairs when
completing a puzzle together in contrast to a condition in which subjects completed identical but individual puzzles (same
intention without shared intentionality). Interpersonal neural coordination was also greater when completing a puzzle
together compared to two control conditions including the observation of another pair completing the same puzzle task or
watching a movie with a partner (shared experience). Further, permutation testing revealed that the time course of neural
activation of one subject predicted that of their partner, but not that of others completing the identical puzzle in different
partner sets. Results indicate unique brain-to-brain coupling specific to shared intentionality beyond what has been
previously found by investigating the fundamentals of social exchange.
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Introduction
Human beings possess an extraordinary ability to coordinate
their actions with those of others. This ability, termed ‘shared
intentionality’ refers to collaborative interactions in which indi-
viduals have a mutual goal and coordinated action roles for
its pursuit (Searle, 1983). During shared intentionality, two or
more individuals synchronize their actions in space and time
to instigate change in their environment, a complex skill that
depends on the abilities to share representations, predict actions
and integrate predicted actions of others (Sebanz et al., 2006).
Bratman (1992) notes that shared intentionality requires three
common features, which are mutual responsiveness, commit-
ment to the joint activity and mutual support for the role of
each partner. Others propose that the additional sense of ‘inter-
agency’ allows for a feeling of cohesive accomplishment (Searle,
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1980; Crivelli & Balconi, 2010; Obhi & Hall, 2011). While some
aspects of collaborative social interaction are found in primates
[e.g. basic intention understanding (Call et al., 2004), rudimen-
tary theory of mind (Hare et al., 2000), cooperative group hunt-
ing (Boesch, 1994)], a synthesis of the literature concludes that
humans are motivated to higher degrees than other species to
share emotions, experiences and activities with others of their
own kind (Tomasello et al., 2005).
The foundations of shared intentionality develop early,
incrementallymaturing in complexity to reach themulti-faceted
nature of intricate adult social interactions. This protracted
developmental trajectory points to the integral nature of
this construct among humans. The fundamentals of shared
intentionality are apparent during the first months of life
when human infants demonstrate mutual and synchronous
responsiveness during face-to-face interaction with caregivers
(Trevarthen, 1979). Between 9–12 months this skill develops
more features of shared intentionality as both parties of the
interaction are able to direct their attention and actions towards
a third person or object (Ross & Lollis, 1987), with active
engagement led by the infant reachingmaturational peak before
15 months of age (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). Findings from
the adult social interaction literature note that humans have
a natural tendency to unintentionally coordinate their motor
behavior with others with whom they are working on a task
and that this synchronization facilitates the smoothness of
interaction, liking and rapport between interaction partners
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Studies designed to experimentally
facilitate or hinder behavioral synchronization have found
that increased synchronization correlates with more positive
feelings about the interaction, a sense of connectedness with an
interaction partner and increased perception of unity by third-
party individuals (Marsh et al., 2009). Further support for the
role that synchronization plays in general human society comes
from studies finding that individuals who coordinate actions
with their partners tend to bemore empathic and pro-social and
that this synchronization enhances altruistic behavior and coop-
eration during shared intentionality (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
Although attention has been paid to the behavioral aspects
of shared intentionality (Marsh et al., 2009), as well as its hypoth-
esized role in shaping of human societal institutions (Tomasello
et al., 2005), the mechanism in which an individual brain might
adjust to goal-sharing beyond the already demanding neural
processes involved in the pursuit of a complex objective is
a question under ongoing investigation (Sebanz et al., 2006).
Previous research has investigated the brain bases of the rele-
vant building blocks of shared intentionality, such as biological
motion perception (Bonda et al., 1996), eye contact (Pelphrey et
al., 2004), and theory of mind/mentalizing (Saxe & Kanwisher,
2003), localizing a portion of its circuitry to themedial and lateral
pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and temporal regions (Van Overwalle,
2009). One study by Pfeiffer et al., (2014) incorporated those basic
building blocks into a controlled interaction in which partici-
pants perceived an avatar to either be controlled by a person
or a computer program. The perception of social interaction
with a human partner produced activation in reward-related
circuitry including the striatum and portions of the PFC. How-
ever, despite these studies demonstrating the central role of
social interaction in shaping cognition, most have focused on
the neural underpinnings of the isolated individual rather than
on the synchronization of neural activation between partners
during interaction. Some studies have noted inter-individual
coupling of activation patterns during storytelling (Stephens et
al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017), gesture (Schippers et al., 2010), facial
expression (Anders et al., 2011), and film viewing (Hasson et al.,
2004); however, brain activation data were collected individually
while simulating social interaction in an experimental context
(e.g. viewing videos of the social partner).
This focus on the individual brain while probing the under-
lying neural systems involved in inherently social processes
has led to a recent call for a field shift away from ‘isolation
paradigms’ (Becchio et al., 2010) and towards ‘second-person
neuroscience’ in which the cerebral underpinnings of social cog-
nition are fundamentally different when a person is involved in,
vsmerely observing and social interaction (Schilbach et al., 2013).
Since hyperscanning (i.e. measuring the activation of inter-
acting brains simultaneously) was first introduced (Montague
et al., 2002), a variety of paradigms has been employed to assess
interpersonal brain synchrony using fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging), EEG (electroencephalography) and fNIRS
(functional near-infrared spectroscopy). These paradigms have
included directed imitation of hand gestures (Dumas et al.,
2010), directed eye gaze in a joint attention task (Saito et al.,
2010), coordination of response time (Cui et al., 2012; Hu et
al., 2017), cooperative singing (Osaka et al., 2015) and playing
Jenga (Liu et al., 2016). Findings from these studies have
routinely implicatedmultiple regions of the PFC in interpersonal
neural synchronization during social interaction. Other studies
have produced similar findings when social discourse is
unrestrained (Jiang et al., 2012, 2015) or even outside of the
typical laboratory context (Lindenberger et al., 2009; Dikker et
al., 2017;). While the previously cited studies have provided
ground breaking evidence of inter-brain synchronization during
multiple levels of general social interaction and experimenter-
directed simple cooperation, it remains unclear how the brains
of multiple individuals might coordinate during more complex
and unconstrained problem-solving.
Our goal in the current study was to conduct a well-
controlled investigation of interpersonal PFC synchrony during
shared intentionality, using a simple yet challenging problem-
solving task. We monitored the lateral PFC of trios of subjects
simultaneously, during an interactive task with three control
conditions designed to simulate similar audiovisual conditions
without shared intentionality. While the medial PFC and
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) have also been implicated in
social cognition, we chose to image only the lateral PFC as
there were only a limited number of channels to be divided
among the three subjects, and the lateral PFC is known to yield
high-quality fNIRS data. We hypothesized that inter-individual
synchronization would be greater during shared intentionality
than while individuals either worked on identical tasks but did
not share intention or observed others completing a similar task.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Twenty triads of adult subjects (n= 60 individuals) were included
in the experiment. Subjects were asked to participate in the
experiment with two companions of their choice, provided that
none of the group of three was in a romantic or family relation-
ship (e.g. friends, colleagues). We chose to limit the groups to
non-family or romantic relationships in order to limit the range
of intimacy of the sample as much as possible. Subjects self-
identified as 63% Caucasian, 7% African-American, 28% Asian,
and 2% Biracial (mean age = 19.73, s.d.= 1.02, range 18–22 years).
All were currently enrolled in college. Thirty-seven females and
23 males participated. Eleven triads consisted of all females,
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Fig. 1. Visual representation of the Tangram puzzle task. Subjects were asked to complete a single puzzle working as a dyad in the ‘together active’ condition but
were asked to complete the same puzzle while working individually in the ‘apart’ condition. In order to control for equal sensory input across subjects and conditions,
subjects observed an unknown pair completing a puzzle as a dyad on a video screen in the ‘movie’ condition or observed their remaining two companions complete
the puzzle in the ‘together passive’ condition.
5 triads consisted of all males and 4 triads contained both
males and females. Subjects reported no use of psychotropic
medications. Data were collected, but not analyzed, for a single
triad due to equipment error, leaving a final sample of 19 triads
(57 individuals).
Task procedure
Throughout the testing session, subjects completed Tangrams,
which are dissection puzzles consisting of flat geometric shapes
put together to form larger shapes (an object or animal), pre-
sented on a card. The objective of the task was to quickly form
the larger shape, given only its silhouette, in a 2 min period.
Tangrams are quite challenging and require advanced spatial
and geometric skills. Before testing, subjects were familiarized
with the concept and history of Tangrams and given time to
practice a single puzzle both alone and with a partner.
All three subjects were seated at a round table. Our goal was
to create one experimental condition in which subjects com-
pleted a task that encouraged shared intentionality and a second
experimental condition in which the subjects completed the
same task but were discouraged from the sharing of intention.
We operationalized shared intentionality as joint attention to
the stimulus with a mutual goal of problem-solving through
interaction. Thus, subjects were asked to complete Tangram
puzzles in cooperationwith a partner during the ‘together active’
condition and individually during the ‘apart’ condition. All con-
ditions contained a single puzzle card and 21 geometric shapes
in the viewing area of all subjects; Seven pieces are assigned
to each subject (Figure 1). In the ‘together active’ condition, two
subjects were allowed to freely interact in order to complete
the puzzle using their combined 14 pieces. Although they were
not prevented from eye contact or gesture, this was rare given
that subjects were seated directly next to each other in order to
view the puzzle from the same perspective. Instead, participants
mostly focused on the puzzle and communicated verbally while
moving pieces. The third member of the triad silently watched
the interaction without participation (‘together passive’ condi-
tion, see below). His/her seven puzzle pieces remained on the
table but sat untouched.
In the ‘apart’ condition, all three subjects were given the
exact same puzzle to work on at the exact same time but were
told to complete the Tangram without interacting with their
companions, each using his/her own 7 puzzle pieces. It was
stressed that they were not in competition with each other. This
allowed for conditions in which intentionality was equal, but
shared intentionality (joint attention, mutual problem-solving
and social interaction) differed. Puzzles used in the ‘apart’
condition required the standard seven geometric shapes (two
large right triangles, one medium-sized right triangle, two small
right triangles, one small square and one parallelogram). Puzzles
used in the ‘together active’ and ‘together passive’ conditions
required two sets of Tangrams (14 geometric shapes), making
these puzzles approximately twice as difficult as the ‘apart’
puzzles.We designed this task to be quite difficult to ensure that
subjects spent as much of the full 2 min as possible engaged on
the task rather than terminating joint/individual attention once
a puzzle was completed. Subjects were given two backup cards
and were told to flip the next card over and move on to the next
puzzle in the event that they completed the Tangram before the
2 min period ended.
Two additional conditions were designed to control for the
possibility that observed synchronous hemodynamic activation
was due to shared sensory input rather than shared intention-
ality. In the ‘movie’ condition, the card and puzzle pieces were
removed from the table. Subjectswere directed to amovie screen
sitting directly in front of the table in which they watched an
unknown pair complete a 14-piece puzzle (equivalent to the
‘together active/passive’ conditions). Subjects were able to view
the hands and hear the voices of the unknown pair to mimic
the manner in which they would see and hear their own hands
and voices during the ‘together active’ condition. The pair in the
video contained one male and one female, one light-skinned
and one dark-skinned, in order for the subjects to be able to
distinguish the voices and hands of the pair. The pair in the
video did not complete a single puzzle but worked on it for
the duration of each movie. In the ‘together passive’ condition,
interpersonal neural synchronization was measured between
the passive participant and each of the two active participants
in the ‘together active’ condition.
All task blocks lasted for 2 min in duration with 45 s between
each period to get situated (clear puzzles, prepare for next trial,
etc.). Subjects completed three task blocks for each of the four
conditions (movie, apart and together), for a total of 32 min
and 15 s of data collection. The sequence of conditions was
counterbalanced across triads. For the ‘together’ conditions, the
experimenter assigned which two subjects would participate
while the other watched, rotating between all three possibilities.
Twenty-seven percent of total puzzles were completed (15% for
‘together active’ trials and 23% for ‘apart’ trials). No individual
subjects or pairs of subjects were able to complete both the
original and all backup puzzles during the 2 min period.
fNIRS Data Collection
Non-invasive optical imagingwas performedusing a continuous-
wave CW6 fNIRS system (TechEn Inc, Milford, MA). Light was
emitted at 690 nm and 830 nm from a total of 12 sources
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Fig. 2. Probe rendering on 3D brain. Renderings of the fNIRS probe superimposed
on the right hemisphere (left) and dorsal (right) views of the Colin27 brain
template. The red points represent sources, the blue points are detectors and
the green lines are measurement channels.
and measured from 18 detectors, which were divided evenly
between the subjects in each triad. Sensors were mounted onto
a neoprene head cap, with a source–detector distance of 2.9–
3.1 cm. The probe extended over the inferior frontal gyrus and
middle frontal gyrus of each hemisphere of the PFC (Figure 2).
The optical data were collected at 20 Hz.
Preprocessing
Raw fNIRS intensity signals were first converted to changes in
optical density. The datawere then corrected formotion artifacts
by calculating the temporal derivative and iteratively reweight-
ing the values using Tukey’s bisquare function until the observa-
tionweights stabilized.This effectively reduces themagnitude of
large fluctuations (i.e. motion) in the signal, while leaving small
fluctuations (i.e. hemodynamics) intact. A manuscript detail-
ing this method is currently under review. Signals were then
resampled to 4Hz and converted to oxygenated hemoglobin con-
centration using the modified Beer–Lambert relationship with a
differential pathlength factor of six and a partial volume correc-
tion of 60 for both the 690 nm and 830 nm wavelengths.
Quantification of interpersonal neural synchronization
Data from the 19 triads of participants were divided pairwise
into three dyads each (n = 57) for analysis of interpersonal
synchronization. In other words, a triad containing subjects A,
B and C, was split into dyadic synchrony calculations for A-B,
B-C and C-A. This was necessary given that ‘together’ blocks
were ‘active’ for two subjects and ‘passive’ for the other, prohibit-
ing a common condition label for the entire triad.
Previous research from our group has shown that serial cor-
relations in time series data can artificially inflate estimates of
functional connectivity resulting from either Pearson correlation
or wavelet transform coherence (Santosa et al., 2017). However,
the false discovery rate can be controlled by calculating the
robust correlation coefficient of the temporallywhitened signals.
Specifically, this was accomplished by fitting an autoregressive
model to each signal, with the model order selected using the
Bayesian Information Criterion. In Santosa et al., (2017), a maxi-
mummodel order of 10–20was found to be necessary to properly
whiten fNIRS signals. We chose a conservative maximal model
order of 32 to be certain that the signals were whitened. The new
information introduced to the autoregressivemodel at each time
point, also known as the innovations, were taken as the tem-
porally whitened version of the signal for connectivity analysis.
The robust correlation coefficientswere calculated between each
pair of channels between participants using the robust regres-
sion approach, in which the geometric mean is taken of the
robust regression coefficients obtained from regressing channel
X onto channel Y and vice versa, e.g. r =
√
β̂X→Y β̂Y→X. Synchro-
nization was then quantified using the Fisher z-transformation
of the absolute value of the robust correlation coefficient.
Owing to the balanced nature of the design (e.g. each par-
ticipant performed all conditions/roles), the position of each
subject within the connectivity model was arbitrary. Therefore,
any asymmetries in connectivity would not be interpretable (e.g.
the presence of connectivity between the channel X of subject
A to channel Y of subject B but not vice versa has no clear
meaning). For this reason, symmetry was imposed such that the
correlation between channel X of subject A and channel Y of
subject B was made equal to the correlation between channel
Y of subject A and channel X of subject B. This was done by
taking the mean of the z-value, e.g. ZXY = 12
(
ZXAYB + ZXBYA
)
.
Symmetrized z-transformed connectivity matrices for each task
block were then averaged to produce the mean connectivity for
each condition within each dyad.
For visualization of data quality, we have provided a sample
1 min time series of the ‘together active’ and ‘apart’ conditions,
taken from the same channel-pair and dyad (Figure 3). To aid
in visualization, these time series were band-pass filtered with
cutoffs at 0.01 Hz and 1.5 Hz and were not whitened. The shaded
region represents the differences between the pairs of time
series. In this figure,more synchrony can be seen in the ‘together
active’ condition than in the ‘apart’ condition.
Statistical analysis
Group-level effects were analyzed for each channel-pair by sub-
mitting the connectivity values to a linear mixed effects model
with condition (‘Together Active’, ‘Together Passive’, ‘Apart’ and
‘Movie’) as a fixed effect and subject dyad as a randomeffect. The
‘Fixation’ condition was not analyzed as it was deemed to serve
more as a preparatory period than natural rest. The effect of each
condition and each of the pairwise contrasts was assessed by
applying the corresponding t-contrasts.
To determine the appropriate null hypotheses for the con-
trasts of interest, a parametric permutation test was used to
estimate a null distribution for each contrast at each channel-
pair. This was done by performing the entire first- and second-
level analysis 10 000 times on random non-concurrent sets of
dyads (i.e. subjects from different scanning sessions). For each
channel-pair and contrast, the null hypothesis was calculated
as the contrast beta averaged across all 10 000 random per-
mutations. The null hypothesis beta values were then supplied
during the calculation of the t-contrasts on the observed data,
e.g. t = CT(β̂−β0)√
var(CT β̂)
.
Correction for multiple comparisons was performed by
calculating the Benjamini–Hochberg false discovery rate (FDR)-
corrected p-value (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) (denoted
throughout as ‘q-value’) across all unique channel-pairs and
contrasts within each hypothesis family.
Results
Differences in inter-subject connectivity during shared
intentionality
The estimated coefficients of the inter-subject connectivity
networks for the ‘together active’, ‘together passive’, ‘apart’
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Fig. 3. Sample fNIRS signals.Normalized signals recorded from two subjects are shown, taken from the ‘together active’ (top) and ‘apart’ (bottom) conditions.Differences
between each pair of signals are shaded. Synchronization is observed only in the ‘together active’ condition.
and ‘movie’ conditions relative to the null distribution derived
from permutation testing are shown in Figure 4. Comparisons
between ‘together active’ and each of the other conditions are
shown in Figure 5. The ‘together active’ condition was found
to have greater interpersonal neural synchronization than the
‘movie’ [peak connection: t(224) = 4.72, q < 0.001], ‘apart’ [peak
connection: t(224) = 3.58, q < 0.05] and ‘together passive’ [peak
connection: t(224) = 3.63, q < 0.05] conditions.We note that none
of the control conditions (‘movie, ‘apart’, ‘together passive’) had
significant differences in interpersonal neural synchronization
when compared to each other.
In Figure 6, we present the results of our permutation analy-
ses for the peak connection for visualizations purposes, includ-
ing the probability density function for the null distribution in
reference to the observed values for each condition. Since the
null distribution was computed independently for each condi-
tion, the results were transformed into the standard normal
distribution for comparison. This was accomplished by subtract-
ing the null mean and dividing by the null standard deviation
(Z = β−μ0
σ0
), within each condition. Once the observed and
null values were standardized, the null distribution was pooled
across conditions for visualization. The range of values that are
beyond the tail of the null distribution at q < 0.05 is shown as
the shaded regions.
For posterity, a post hoc power analysis was conducted on
the mean synchrony values for the ‘Together Active’ condi-
tion. In order for a two-tailed one-sample t-test against the
permutation-derived null distribution to have a power of 0.90
with a significance level of p< 0.05, a sample size of N= 13 dyads
is required.
Discussion
The current study examined the neural mechanistic features
of shared intentionality. Our results uncovered a significant
increase in interpersonal neural synchronization between the
PFCs of individuals when the pair was engaged in action
towards amutually held goal. In contrast,when individuals were
separated and engaged in identical, but individualistic, goal-
directed action,or observing others complete that action, both by
video and in person, significant changes in interpersonal neural
synchronization were absent. Further, using a null distribution
derived from non-interacting subjects, we demonstrate that
these differences must be attributed to joint performance of the
task, rather than some property of the task condition itself. This
highlights the unique coupling in the neural processes between
individual brains that has been hypothesized to occur via the
transmission of signals through the environment (Hasson et al.,
2004).
Our findings may indicate that there is a brain-to-brain
coupling specific to shared intentionality during physical
goal-directed behavior above and beyond what has been
found by investigating the fundamentals of social exchange.
Stephens et al., (2010) recorded the time course of BOLD
signal change in fMRI while a speaker told a personal story.
Correlations between fluctuations in that time course and the
neural time course of others, while listening to the recording
during a separate fMRI testing session, were found in the
dorsolateral PFC among other regions. Similar results have been
found in studies of gestural communication (Schippers et al.,
2010). Specifically using fNIRS as a measurement technique,
Jiang et al., (2012) found significantly increased interpersonal
neural synchronization in the PFCwhen the speaker and listener
were face-to-face compared to when they were back-to-back,
which also correlated with increased multi-modal (i.e. speech,
gestural) turn-taking behavior. Specific to joint action, pairs
of guitarists playing a short melody together show increased
between-brain oscillatory coupling, measured through EEG
(Lindenberger et al., 2009), with recent similar findings emerging
in the domain of classroom learning (Dikker et al., 2017). The
current study, however, is the first to probe interpersonal neural
synchronization as a mechanism for shared intentionality
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Fig. 4. Mean inter-subject synchronization for each condition.The inter-subject synchronization in the ‘together active’, ‘together passive’, ‘apart’ and ‘movie’ conditions
relative to the null distribution derived from permutation testing. Relative Fisher’s Z-values are shown for all possible connections. Warm colors indicate connections
stronger than the null mean, while cool colors indicate those weaker.
Fig. 5. Comparisons of inter-subject synchronization between conditions. The ‘together active’ condition had significantly greater inter-subject synchronization than
the ‘together passive’, ‘movie’ and ‘apart’ conditions at an FDR-corrected threshold of q< 0.05. The ‘together active’ condition had no connections that were significantly
less than any other condition.
by investigating the real-time, naturalistic interaction of two
individuals during collaborative problem-solving, including all
of Bratman’s (1992) criteria (mutual responsiveness between
partners, commitment to the joint activity and mutual support
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Fig. 6. Results from the permutation test visualized for a single channel-
pair. Grey bars represent the histogram of the standardized null distribution
generated from non-concurrent participant pairs. The grey line represents the
fit of a normal distribution to the null data. The shaded regions represent the
tails of the distribution significant at an FDR-corrected threshold of q < 0.05.
The observed inter-subject synchronization for the ‘together active’ condition
was significantly greater than the null distribution, while that of the ‘together
passive’, ‘apart’ and ‘movie’ conditions was not.
of the role of each partner). Here, we demonstrate increased
interpersonal neural synchronization in the PFC above and
beyond that, which would be expected when two subjects
simultaneously experience a rich auditory and visual stimulus
such as a movie (Hasson et al., 2004). Thus, our findings are
critical to advancing scientific knowledge of the biological
demands of the integral social construct of shared intentionality.
Though speculative in the current context, some of themech-
anistic ‘building blocks’ of shared intentionality may have been
driving the findings of our study. In the ‘together active’ condi-
tion, participants were explicitly required to consider not only
their own strategy and intentions for solving the puzzle but also
that of their partner,withwhom theywereworking concurrently.
It is, therefore, likely that this condition required activation of
action-perception system, which is hypothesized as the neu-
ral network underlying theory of mind and includes multiple
regions of the PFC (Carrington & Bailey, 2009). It has been pre-
viously hypothesized that interpersonal neural synchronization,
specifically, is facilitated as a function of the action-perception
system (Jiang et al., 2012) which theorizes that each person
influences his/her environment (including the actions of social
partners), which, in turn, modifies the brain of the actor (Hari &
Kujala, 2009). Thus, our study is among the first to demonstrate
that the PFC is not only active when engaged in a collaborative
task in which coordination and anticipation of a partner’s action
is necessary but that this activation is uniquely coordinated
with that of the other to support active and successful shared
intentionality.
Our findings also fall in line with a second mechanistic;
‘building block’ of shared intentionality called ‘interagency’ or
a situation in which one member of the dyad may perceive
the other’s movement towards the mutual goal as his/her own
agency when working collaboratively (Searle, 1980; Crivelli &
Balconi, 2010;). Evidence for the existence of interagency comes
from studying a phenomenon known as ‘intentional binding’,
in which temporal judgment of the time between action and
effect is judged by the operator to be shorter when the action is
intentional rather than involuntary (Haggard et al., 2002). Inten-
tional binding has been localized to the PFC through studies
in which a sense of agency is blocked when PFC activation
is interrupted through transcranial direct current stimulation
(Khalighinejad et al., 2016). Obhi & Hall, 2011 and Strother et al.,
2010 have noted that this implicit measure of agency appears
independent of social role and can occur equally strongly for
both the initiator and responder during shared intentionality.
For example, in a study in which one member of a dyad was
instructed to press a button, with the other joining in immedi-
ately after, only the initiator reported a subjective experience of
agency but both demonstrated significant and indistinguishable
intentional binding (Obhi & Hall, 2011). In the context of our own
study, this interagency may manifest in heightened interper-
sonal neural synchronization within the PFC when, for example,
one partnermoved a puzzle piece towards the solutionwhile the
second partner only observed that movement, perceiving that
action as partly his/her own. Indeed, interpersonal neural syn-
chronization may represent what Searle (1980) described as ‘we
intentions’ occurring through low-level processes to coordinate
actions in a joint effort.
Although our study is limited in that it focused only upon the
PFC rather than the whole of the social perception circuit (e.g.
superior temporal sulcus (STS), amygdala), our results indicate
a neural mechanism inherent in accomplishing a mutual goal.
Future research on shared intentionality would be useful to
investigate connectivity in thewhole of the circuit during similar
social-interactive paradigms that include tactile manipulation
like the current study. A second limitation of this study is that
not all behaviors may have been equalized between conditions.
It is possible that the ‘Together Active’ condition had greater
synchrony of movements due to turn-taking than other condi-
tions. While we have employed motion correction, and while
we note that not every pair necessarily took turns, it is impos-
sible to say whether some residual effect remains in the data.
Another limitation of our study that is ripe for future study
was that it was designed to equalize some behaviors relevant to
shared intentionality, like task completion and the relationship
between partners. Further, it was not video recorded to examine
inherent variability in variables relating to individual differences
in shared intentionality (e.g. conversational turns, eye contact
or gesture), making it difficult to assign specificity to cognitive
processes in this context.We suggest that future studies encour-
age and examine more extensive variability in behavior and the
nature of the relationship as variables of interests. For example,
increased task length and difficultymight illuminate differences
in skill or personality, potentially leading to leader/follower roles
that could be studied systematically. In addition, the method-
ology of our current study has future implications for better
characterizing the nature of social relationships. While we did
not explicitly quantify the level of intimacy between partners,
future studies could explicitly examine this as a variable, as
well as experimentally manipulate the social relationship (e.g.
friends vs strangers, parents and children) to better characterize
change in interpersonal neural synchronization as a function of
social support.
One additional future direction opens the door for more
extensive application of our paradigm. Our findings shed light
on the biological underpinnings of general human shared
intentionality but also lend themselves to the possibility of
mechanistic understanding of mental disorders in which shared
intentionality is compromised in future work. Along these
lines, developmental deficits in reciprocal social interaction
(e.g. interactive speech) are considered primary diagnostic
criteria of autism spectrumdisorder (ASD) (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013), although several other disorders show
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deficits in general social interaction (Mueser et al., 1991; Segrin,
2000; Uekermann et al., 2010). Studies focusing on behavioral
synchrony in ASD have found that coordination between
children with ASD and their parents is correlated positively with
language skills and negatively with stereotypedmotor behaviors
(Hudry et al., 2013). Marsh et al., (2013) found that children
with ASD do not spontaneously rock in synchrony with their
parent while sitting in rocking chairs, as do typically developing
children. Landa et al., (2011) have found early evidence for
social, language and cognitive gains in toddlers with ASD by
targeting parent–child interpersonal synchrony during early
intervention; however, brain-based mechanistic explanations
for deficits in interpersonal synchrony have not been tested
nor have their applications to therapeutic treatment. Thus,
our findings are poised to contribute to our understanding
of global psychological processes of human interaction, in
addition to deficits of social dysfunction specific to psychiatric
disorders, which highlights the broad clinical utility of our
approach. Future work will address deficits in interpersonal
neural synchronization in ASD and other disorders in which
patients suffer from challenges related to shared intentionality.
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